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THESIS DIGEST: 
MATHEMATICAL INTERPRETATION OF POLITICAL POWER 
AND THE ARKANSAS STATE GOVERNMENT 
By Andrew King 
Department of Mathematics 
Faculty Mentor: Professor Bernard L. Madison 
Department of Mathematics 
Abstract 
On the whole, political power can he very difficult to 
quantify. A person may be powerful due to his or her personal 
charm, wealth, fame, credibility, or influential connections. 
Political bodies do not account for these qualities when creating 
voting procedures; they only assign voting rules to specific 
positions. For example, most would say that in the United States 
government that a Senator is more powerful than a Representative, 
but less powerful than the President, without knowing any way 
to quantify or verify those differences. 
Since the 1950's, mathematicians and political scientists 
have attempted to create mathematical models that partially 
describe an individual's power as a voting member of a committee, 
board, or legislative body. These models have resulted in four 
major "power indexes" that describe the percentage of a body's 
total power held by each individual member. The four most 
prominent power indexes are the Shapley-Shubik, Banzhaf, 
Johnston, and Deegan-Packel, each of which uses a different 
theory to calculate the probability that an individual's vote will 
decide whether a proposal passes or fails. 
The research in this paper develops formulas to calculate 
the four-power indexes for legislatures that are unicameral, 
bicameral, unicameral with committees, and bicameral with 
committees. These formulas have several variables (up to ten) 
and have many (up to several thousand) terms for typical sizes 
of state legislative chambers. Using Mathematica computer 
software the four power indices are computed for various 
legislative configurations and the indices' behavior are studied. 
Then these methods are applied to the Arkansas State Government 
by calculating the power indexes of the Governor, Senate, 
House, House Committee members, and Senate Committee 
members. By examining the theories behind the four power 
indexes and available historical evidence, the paper concludes 
by analyzing which indexes, if my, provide the best mode/for the 
political power structure of the Arkansas State Government. 
Democracy frequently requires a way to translate the 
various preferences of several individuals into a single group 
decision. The most common way of doing this is the yes-no 
voting system, which allows individual voters to decide between 
a single proposal (such as a biii or resolution) and the status quo. 
A yes-no voting system is defined as a set of rules that specifies 
exactly which collections of"yes" votes will pass a proposal [4]. 
Yes-no voting systems are defined in terms of coalitions, or 
specific collections of voters. A coalition is called winning if a 
proposal passes when all of its members vote 'yes' and losing if 
it does not meet this condition. In almost all yes-no voting 
systems, the winning coalitions are those that meet or exceed a 
quota, or the minimal number of votes for a proposal to pass. 
Usually, the quota is a majority, or the smallest whole number of 
votes that is greater than one-half of all possible votes. 
The Four Power Indices: 
Power indices are methods of computing the influence of 
an individual voter on whether a proposal passes or fails in a yes-
no voting system It is always a number between 0 and I, and the 
sum of the power indices for all voters in a yes-no voting system 
wiii always be I. The Shapley-Shubik Index was the first 
developed. 
1. Shapley-Shubik: 
In 1954, Shapley and Shubik applied Shapley's previous 
work regarding multi-person cooperative games to the measure 
of political power. Their definition of power was based on the 
probability that an individual player's vote will be pivotal, that 
is, be the qth voter when the quota is q. To understand this, 
suppose that all voters willing to vote for a proposal line up in 
some random order and vote in turn. Once q voters have voted 
'yes,' the motion is declared passed and the last voter is deemed 
pivotal. The index assumes that all such orderings are equally 
probable [3]. It is computed for an individual voter A by taking 
the fraction of all voter orderings in which A is pivotal. 
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In the process of developing the formulas and applying 
them to various configurations, some very interesting properties 
of the power indices were discovered. For example, two odd-
sized chambers in a pure bicameral system using simple majority 
votes, share Shapley-Shubik power equally. Contrary to published 
literature, the same is not necessarily true if one of the chambers 
has an even number of voters. This result has a side effect of 
producing some very complex combinatorial identities. 
Another way of understanding the Shapley-Shubik Index is 
to assume that players align themselves in order of enthusiasm 
for a proposal, with the strongest supporter first and the strongest 
opponent last. There will be a number of voters "on the fence," 
which the others will have to persuade to join their respective 
coalitions. The player who brings the coalition to winning 
strength is "pivotal," and may determine, in the words of Shapley 
and Dubey, "how strong a law will be enacted, or how much 
money will actually be appropriated for some purpose, or how 
hard a candidate will have to campaign, etc [2]." 
2. Banzhaf: 
To lawyer John Banzhaf III, it was clear that [5], "voting 
power is not proportional to the number of votes a legislator may 
cast." In a 1960s lawsuit involving the Nassau County, New 
York, Board of Supervisors, he was able to demonstrate that 
three of the six supervisors were dummies, or representatives 
with no actual voting power, and that the voting system of the 
board was therefore unconstitutional. To do so, he invented a 
new way to measure political power, which became known as the 
Banzhaf Index of Power [5]. 
The Banzhaf Index is based on the idea of a critical 
defector, a voter in a winning coalition who will cause the 
coalition to lose if that voter is removed from it. To calculate the 
Banzhaf Index for a voter p, one must first count the number of 
coalitions from which p is a critical defector. This is called the 
Total Banzhaf Power of p. The Banzhaf Index of pis the Total 
Banzhaf Power of p divided by the sum of all voters' Total 
Banzhaf Power. 
3. Johnston: 
In 1977, R.J. Johnston, an English geographer, made some 
variations to the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf voting models and 
invented a new power index [ 6]. The Johnston Index of Power is 
similar to the Banzhaf Index in that it is based on critical 
defections. But this time, each time a voter is a critical defector 
from a winning coalition, it is divided by the number of critical 
defectors in that coalition. As before, one must calculate the 
Total Johnston Power of a voter p, denoted TJP (p) where n n 
' 1' 2' 
. . . ni are the number of critical defectors from each coalition: 
TJP(p) = lln1 + J/n2 + . . . + I /ni 
To calculate the Johnston Index, JI (p), one must divide a 
voter's Total Johnston Power by the sum of all voters' Total 
Johnston Power [4]. 
4.1Jeegan-Packel: 
Among the basic assumptions common among the 
Shapley-Shubik, Banzhaf, and Johnston indices is 
that the power to effect change is the same as 
blocking power. In 1978, mathematicians John 
Deegan and Edward Packel suggested that these 
two kinds of power are actually different, and 
proposed an index that could measure the power to 
initiates changes [7]. It is based on minimal 
winning coalitions- those coalitions that will be 
losing if any one member is removed. 
The Deegan-Packel Index of Power is based on three 
assumptions: 
1) Only minimal winning coalitions are relevant 
when determining power. 
2) Each minimal winning coalition forms with equal 
probability. 
3) Any member of a minimal winning coalition gains 
the same mount of power from belonging to that 
coalition as all other members of the coalition [7]. 
To calculate the Deegan-Packel Index for a voter, one must 
first calculate the Total Deegan-Packel Power for that voter-
the number of minimal winning coalitions of which he/she is a 
member. Then that number is divided by the sum of all voters' 
Total Deegan-Packel Power. 
Research Results: 
The goals of this research had two central thrusts: 
1) To develop formulas for computing each of the 
four power indices for four legislative models: 
unicameral, bicameral, unicameral with committees, 
and bicameral with committees. 
2) Apply the formulas to the Arkansas General 
Assembly and its current committee structure. 
Both these goals were accomplished and several significant 
discoveries were made along the way. 
The Formulas: 
Formulas were developed in each of the sixteen situations 
described above, and these formulas were implemented in several 
situations using Mathematica computer software [9]. The 
formulas are very complicated, having hundreds of terms and 
requiring calculations involving very large numbers. As an 
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example, the formula below is for the Shapley-Shubik index for 
one committee member in a bicameral legislature with 
committees. The assumption is that proposals before either 
chamber are first referred to a committee for a recommendation 
(pass or do not pass in the Arkansas legislature). If the committee 
recommends that the proposal be adopted, then the chamber can 
approve with some specified majority. If the committee does not 
recommend that the proposal be adopted then a larger majority 
is likely required for the chamber to pass the proposal. 
Consequently there are ten variables, Nl, Cl, cl,kl, nl,N2, C2, 
c2, k2, and n2, which represent the number of non-committee 
members, number of committee members, committee quota, 
chamber quota, and override quota for each house. 
1 
(Ct + C% + Nl + N2)! 
(l~~:J 
Power Indices for the Arkansas State Government: 
Both the Arkansas House ofRepresentatives ( 100 members) 
and the Arkansas Senate (35 members) have committees that 
function as described above. Most House committees have 20 
members [11], and most Senate committees have 7 members 
[12]. Executive officers with veto power that require super 
majorities to override (such as the U. S. President) will share 
power with the legislative chambers. Although the Arkansas 
Governor has veto power, the House and Senate can override a 
Governor's veto with simple majority vote [10]. Consequently, 
all four of the indices give the Governor zero power. The four 
power indices were computed for the Arkansas House and 
nl-kl ( C% a+N2 
2:(-el::+kl) L:(~) L (::n)(i+kl+m-1)!{C1+C2-i-k1-m+Nl+N2)!+ 
i=O II=C2 .:~a 
~1 ) C2 a+N'l N2 
2:( n) ~ (m-n)(kl+m-l)!(Cl+C2-kl-m+Nl+N2)! + 
a:::O •::a% 
el-2 
~( Nl )(Cl-1) 
~ -i+nl-1 i 
i::O 
(
Cl C2 a+Nl N2 L:( n) L (m_n)<m+nl-l)!{Cl+C2-m-nl+Nl+N2)!+ 
a=% •=Ia 
~· )~ C2 a+Nl N2 2:{ n) L {m-n)<m+nl-1)!(Cl+C2-m-nl+Nl+N2)! 
•:::0 •::a% 
I j, 
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Senate with committees of the current usual size. These are listed 
in the following tables and show that committee members have 
considerably more power than non-committee members in passing 
a particular bill. They also show that the power indices of the 
committees are affected by the existence of the other chamber. 
The last two columns of each table show how the relative power 
of each chamber is affected by the introduction of an internal 
committee structure. 
Properties of the Indices: 
poe Chamber and Its 
w--ommittee 
Non 
S/wpley· ~ommittee ~ommittee 
Shubik Member Member 
!Arkansas 0.03042 0.00489 House, size 
12o committee 
!Arkansas 0.05204 0.02270 Senate, size 7 
[committee 
lone Chamber and Its 
Committee 
!Non 
Committee !committee 
Ban:.lulf !Member !Member 
!Arkansas 
House, size 0.02023 0.00744 ~ 
[committee 
~rkansas 
~enate, size 0.05291 0.02249 
~committee 
lone Chamber and Its 
Committee 
k:ommittee 
IN on 
Pwmittee 
Johnston Member Member 
~rkansas 
!House, size 0.37751 0.00306 12o 
[committee 
jArkansas 
0.09458 0.01207 Senate, size 
17 committee 
One Chamber and Its 
Committee 
Non 
Deegart· Committee [committee 
!combined Two Chambers 
land Their Committees 
jNon 
!committee lcooumttee 
Ratio Member !Member !Ratio 
6.21 0.01856 0.00227 8.18 
2.29 0.02401 0.00997 2.41 
jcombined Two Chambers 
land Their Committees 
IN on 
Committee ~Committee 
Ratio !Member !Member !Ratio 
2.72 0.01510 0.00416 3.63 
2.35 0.01893 0.00830 2.28 
[combined Two Chambers 
and Their Committees 
Committee 
IN on 
[committee 
Ratio Member !Member [Bano 
The work to establish techniques for analyzing the power 
structure of bicameral legislatures has yielded several important 
discoveries. First of all, several complex combinatorial identities 
have been discovered, including the complex expression for the 
Shapley-Shubik Index of a committee member shown above. By 
programming each index into Mathematica, one can create two-
and three-dimensional graphs that illustrate the behavior of each 
Sum of Power 
without 
f"'ommittees 
0.5204 
0.4796 
~umofPower 
without 
lrommittees 
0.6453 
0.3548 
~umofPower 
!without 
1 .... 
~umof 
!Power with 
Committees 
0.5528 
0.4472 
t 
~umof 
jPowerwlth 
Committees 
0.6350 
0.3650 
Sum of 
Power with 
power index as a function of committee size, 
chamber size, and quotas. Examples of such 
behaviors are that increasing the quota of both 
chambers almost always increases the power 
of the larger chamber, that a committee is 
always more powerful than a voting block of 
the same size, and that the four indices exhibit 
widely different behaviors at extreme values. 
One of the most notable results of this 
analysis actually contradicts an assertion 
originally made by Shipley and Shubik in 
1954. Regarding the properties of the Shapley-
Shubiklndex, they stated, 0 oo In pure bicameral 
systems using simple majority votes, each 
chamber gets 50% of the power (as it turns 
out), regardless of the relative sizes [3].oo± 
This is true ifboth chambers are the same size, 
or if both chambers have an odd number of 
members, which was proven by simplifying 
the formula for the Shapley-Shubik Index 
withMathematica. The simplified expression 
was proven to equall/2 by Emeritus Professor 
John Duncan, using double induction on the 
residues of the tangent and gamma functions 
of a complex variable. 
123.28 0.01687 0.00161 10.45 0.4060 0.4666 
7.84 0.04762 0.00715 6.66 0.5941 0.5334 
Combined Two Chambers 
~d Their Committees t 
Non Sum of Power Sum of 
Committee Committee without Power with 
Packel Member Member Ratio Member Member Ratio Committees Committeees 
But examples show that two chambers 
do not always share power equally when one 
or both of them have an even number of 
members, such as the Arkansas State 
Legislature, which has a 100-memberchamber 
with S2% of the power and a 35-member 
chamber with 48% of the power. This may be 
confirmed by visually inspecting the following 
two graphs. The graph on the left plots the 
Shapley-Shubik Index of a variable odd 
chamber with a majority quota against a fixed 
odd chamber with 49 members and quota of 
25. The graph on the right plots the Shapley-
Shubik Index of a variable even chamber with 
a majority quota against the fixed odd chamber 
with 49 members. Each point on the horizontal 
axis represents the quota of the variable 
chamber. Notice that the Shapley-Shubik 
Index of the odd chamber remains constant 
~rkansas 
House, size 0.01178 0.00955 1.23 20 0.00864 0.00700 1.23 0.73193 0.732822 
[committee 
!Arkansas 
0.03200 0.02771 1.15 0.00854 Senate, size 0.00741 1.15 0.26807 0.267178 
17 committee 
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SSI Odd vs.Odd 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
at.5, while the Shapley-Shubik Index of the even chamber 
declines as it gets larger. 
Conclusions: 
This research has provided several revealing insights into 
the political power structure of bicameral legislatures, including 
the Arkansas General Assembly. The four power indices all 
confirm the strong influence of legislative committees, and all 
show that a committee is always more powerful than a voting 
block of the same size. The power indices also indicate some 
relationships that are somewhat surprising. For example, internal 
committees affect the relative power of two chambers. It also 
seems that the relative power of a committee is affected by the 
size and existence of another chamber. 
The ability to program formulas for each power index and 
situation into Mathematica has lead to several meaningful 
discoveries about the properties of each power index. Among 
these properties are the effect of relative chamber size, the effect 
of quotas, and the overall influence of committees on a bicameral 
legislature. 
Being able to understand the four power indices as 
mathematical functions lays the basis for evaluating which index 
provides the best measure of power for the Arkansas State 
Government. There are unique characteristics of each index that 
should be considered. For example, the Deegan-Packel Index is 
very consistent across the three systems -bicameral, unicameral 
with committees, arid bicameral with committees-but does not 
place much power in legislative committees. The Banzhaflndex 
varies the most widely among the three voting situations, but 
gives a moderate amount of power to legislative committees. 
The Shapley-Shubik Index is based on fundamental concepts of 
game theory and distributes power in a fairly consistent manner. 
When complemented by historical and political analysis, these 
characteristics could be used to determine which, if any, of these 
indices are effective measures of voting power in bicameral 
legislatures such as the Arkansas General Assembly. 
SSI 
0.615 
0.65 
0.625 
0.575 
0.55 
0.525 
Evenvs.Odd 
40 50 
From the UN Security Council to the University of Arkansas 
student government, voting bodies make many important 
decisions that affect large numbers of people. Therefore, 
ascertaining the power of individual voters is a worthwhile 
undertaking. This research takes advantage of the latest computing 
technology, establishing several techniques that can be used to 
evaluate a wide variety of voting bodies. These techniques 
provide a way to quantify voting power and could be used to 
design more effective legislative systems. 
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Faculty Comment: 
Mr. King's faculty mentor, Professor Bernard Madison had 
this to say about Mr. King's research: 
Andrew's research area is outside anything we offer 
inundergraduateorgraduatestudies.Theonlyrelated 
courses in mathematics are in introductory 
combinatorics. Consequently, Andrew began by 
reading through Alan Taylor' sMathematics and Politics 
(Springer-Verlag, 1995) and several research journal 
papers to establish a knowledge base for this research. 
From the beginning, Andrew wanted to investigate 
mathematical measures of political power. This led to 
a study of yes-no voting systems, which can be 
considered as part of cooperative/ competitive game 
theory. The use of game theory to study distribution 
of power in voting systems can he traced back to John 
von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern in their 1944 
classic, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Results 
in this area moved into the public eye with the book 
and movie, A Beautiful Mind, about the life of Nobel 
Laureate John Forbes Nash. 
Over the past half-century, four indices of political 
power have been developed, often as results of legal 
arguments over legislative apportionment and voting 
rights. The four indices carry the names of their 
creators: Shapley-Shubik (1954), Banzhaf (1965), 
Johnston (1978), and Deegan-Packel (1978). The 
Shapley-Shubik index is best known and emerged in 
Andrew's work as the one receiving most attention 
and often making the most sense. Andrew's research 
focused on the application of these indexes to 
legislatures: unicameral, bicameral, unicameral with 
committees, and bicameral with committees. His main 
results were obtained by achieving the following two 
rather ambitious goals: 
1. Developing expressions for computing each of the 
four power indices for each of the four legislative 
models - for committee members, non-committee 
members, and the full chambers. 
2. Applying the four indices to the Arkansas General 
Assembly and its current committee structures. 
Until recently, computing these indices for a state 
legislative body was virtually impossible because of 
the complexity and the large numbers involved. For 
example, computing the Shapley-Shubik index for 
the Arkansas Senate and House of Representatives 
requires summing several thousand terms involving 
ten variables and then dividing by 135, a 231-digit 
number! Andrew developed expressions to do this 
and then used Mathematica for the computations. The 
formulas are extremely complex sums of binomial 
coefficients and factorial expressions and represent a 
major accomplishment-in my view an 
accomplishment that is most extraordinary for an 
undergraduate research project. 
Along the way to these two main goals, Andrew 
discovered results that give glimpses of the 
interrelationships of the indices and reveal very 
interesting aspects of their behavior when applied to 
bicameral systems. For example, Shapley and Shubik, 
in their 1954 paper, state, "In pure bicameral systems 
using simple majority votes, each chamber gets 50% 
of the power (as it turns out), regardless of the relative 
sizes. "They were referring to what is now known as 
the Shapley-Shubik index as a measure of power. 
Andrew was able to prove this (using Mathernatica 
and computing residues of the tangent and gamma 
functions of a complex variable) if the size of each 
house in the bicameral system is odd and if each quota 
for passing a proposal is the simple majority. However, 
if the sizes of both chambers are not both odd (as in the 
Arkansas General Assembly), then the chambers need 
not share power equally, even when using simple 
majority votes. Andrew showed this by constructing 
examples with small numbers as well as with the 
Arkansas General Assembly. A sideresultofknowing 
that the above result for odd-sized chambers is a 
wealth of very complex combinatorial identities. 
Andrew's research is significant, complex, and highly 
relevant. As far as I am able to discern, many of his 
results are original; indeed, he developed all results 
independently. Although mathematical power 
indexes cannot account for many of the aspects of 
political power (for example, all the indexes give the 
Arkansas Governor zero power in the legislative 
process because only simple majorities are required 
to override a veto), they do give insight into structural 
issues in legislatures. Not surprisingly, they show 
that committee members considering a bill have 
considerably more power over that bill than do non-
committeemembers.So,Andrew'sworkshouldhave 
wider appeal than most research in mathematics. His 
accomplishments far exceed what I consider normal 
for a strong undergraduate honors thesis, and he has 
achieved these accomplishments with minimal 
guidance from me. He has showed uncanny ability to 
sort through and organize some enormous counting 
problems, to program the resulting expressions in 
Mathematica and to interpret the results with maturity 
far beyond his experiences. His intuition about both 
mathematics and politics helped immensely. 
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